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David Makinson 
 
 
Abstract  
 
The concept of relevance between classical propositional formulae, defined in terms 
of letter-sharing, has been around for a very long time. But it began to take on a fresh 
life in the late 1990s when it was reconsidered in the context of the logic of belief 
change. Two new ideas appeared in independent work of Odinaldo Rodrigues and 
Rohit Parikh. First, the relation of relevance was considered modulo the belief set 
under consideration, Second, the belief set was put in a canonical form, known as its 
finest splitting. In this paper we explain these ideas; relate the approaches of 
Rodrigues and Parikh to each other; briefly report some recent results of Kourousias 
and Makinson on the extent to which AGM belief change operations respect 
relevance; and finally show how the introduction of a further parameter allows one to 
take into account epistemic and other components of relevance as well as purely 
logical ones.     
 
 
1. Logical Relevance as a Two-Place Relation 
 
The idea of defining a notion of relevance between propositional formulae goes back 
a long way. In the context of classical logic, which will be our focus, the simplest 
definition to suggest itself is the following: 
 
Definition 1.1 Let a,b be formulae of classical propositional logic. They are 
syntactically relevant to each other iff they share some elementary letter. 
 
Bibliographical: It is not clear when this definition was first formulated. Perhaps 
traces of it may even be found in Boole in the mid-nineteenth century. In the 1950s it 
was used as an adequacy condition by the founders of so-called relevance logic – a 
subsystem of classical logic satisfying the condition that syntactically irrelevant 
formulae never imply one another. In this paper we are not concerned with those 
logics: our concern is with refinements and deployments of the concept in classical 
contexts.  
 
Shortcoming: As defined, the notion of syntactic relevance is syntax-dependent. In 
other words, formulae a,b may be classically equivalent to a′,b′ respectively, and a 
relevant to b but  a′ not relevant to b′.   
 
Example: ¬p∧(¬p∨q) is syntactically relevant to q, but the former is classically 
equivalent to ¬p which is not relevant to q. Here and always in the paper, p,q, … are 
understood to be elementary letters while a,b,… are arbitrary formulae.  
 
To overcome this, the obvious move is to express each formulae in its least letter-set, 
using the well-known:  
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Fact: for every formula a, there is a unique least set of elementary letters such that a 
may equivalently be expressed using only letters from that set.  
 
Examples: The unique least letter-set of ¬p∧(¬p∨q) is {p}. On the other hand, the 
unique least letter-set  of ¬p∧(¬r∨q) is {p,q,r}.  
 
Remarks: (1) Strictly speaking, the result holds in this simple form only when the 
language has a primitive zero-ary operator (propositional constant) such as the falsum. 
In such a language, the least letter-set of any non-contingent formula is ∅. Without a 
zero-ary connective, say with just ¬, ∧, ∨, any tautology or contradiction has many 
minimal letter-sets (in fact, all the singleton letter sets), but has no least one (since no 
formula is bereft of letters). For simplicity of formulation, in this paper we work with 
a language that does has a primitive zero-ary connective, e.g. the falsum. (2) The 
result stated is intuitively obvious, but needs proof. Getting minimal letter sets is 
trivial since every formula contains only finitely many letters; but getting a least one 
(which, by the antisymmetry of set-inclusion, will be unique) requires a bit more 
work. See the appendix of Makinson (2007), where the result is shown to hold, more 
generally, for arbitrary sets A of formulae.   
 
We write a* for an (arbitrarily chosen) formula equivalent to a that is built in the least 
letter-set for a.  
 
Definition 1.2 Let a,b be formulae of classical propositional logic. They are said to be 
essentially relevant to each other iff a*,b* share some elementary letter. Equivalently: 
iff every formula equivalent to a shares a letter with every formula equivalent to b. 
 
Example: Although ¬p∧(¬p∨q) is syntactically relevant to q, it is not essentially so, 
since (¬p∧(¬p∨q))* = ¬p shares no letter with q* = q. 
      
Features: Essential relevance has the following properties: 
• It is syntax-independent (immediate from definition). 
• It is symmetric (immediate from definition). 
• Reflexive? Nearly: every contingent formula is relevant to itself. Non-
contingent formulae are not relevant to anything. 
• Not transitive. Example: p is essentially relevant to p∧q which is so to q, but p 
is not so to q. 
• Cannot be ‘made transitive’: its transitive closure makes any two contingent 
formula relevant to each other. Verification: Take contingent a,c. Since a is 
contingent, a* contains a letter p, likewise c* contains a letter q. Put b = p∧q = 
b*.  Then a is essentially relevant to b, also b to c, so transitive closure would 
make a relevant to c.  
• No two distinct elementary letters are relevant to each other (immediate from 
definition).  
 
This is all part of the folklore, and dates back a long way. However, things began to 
take a fresh turn in the late 1990s, when a few people began thinking about relevance 
in the context of formal accounts of belief change. Two basic insights emerged. The 
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first was that in this context, the relevance or irrelevance of one formula to another 
may be taken to depend not only one the formulae themselves but also on the belief 
set under consideration. The second was that this belief set may be given a canonical 
form known as its finest splitting. The following two sections explain and comment 
on them.   
 
 
2. Path-Relevance Modulo a Belief Set  
 
Suppose that we have the belief set K = {p→q, q→r}, where p,q,r are distinct 
elementary letters. As such, they are irrelevant to each other. But it is natural to say 
that from the point of view of the belief set K, p is relevant to q, q is relevant to r, and 
p is thus indirectly relevant to r.  This suggests the following definition. 
 
Definition 2.1. (Odinaldo Rodrigues). Let a,b be formulae of classical propositional 
logic, and let K be a set of formulae serving as a belief set. We say that a is path-
relevant to b (mod K) iff there is a finite sequence x0,…xn+1 (n ≥ 0) of formulae with 
x0 = a*, xn+1 = b*, x1,…,xn ∈ K, and each xi shares at least one letter with xi+1. 
 
Comments: Note that x1,…,xn are required to be elements of K. Thus we are looking at 
finite paths through K. On the other hand, it is not required that either of x0 = a*, xn+1 
= b* is in K (although of course they may be).  
 
Bibliographical: This notion was introduced by Rodrigues in his thesis (1997), 
Appendix A, definition 8.14. It was used by Renata Wassermann in her thesis (1999) 
and in subsequent papers e.g. Riana and Wassermann (2004). Actually, all these 
authors used a,b instead of a*,b* in the definition, but we make it syntax-independent 
in those two arguments.  
 
Path-relevance generalizes essential relevance in a natural way: the latter amounts to 
requiring that n = 0 in Definition 2.1. Like essential relevance, has the following 
properties: 
• Syntax-independent in a,b. 
• Symmetric. 
• Almost reflexive: Every contingent formula is relevant to itself, but no 
tautology or contradiction is relevant to anything.,  
• Not transitive. 
With K as parameter, new features emerge: 
• Distinct elementary letters can be relevant to each other (mod K). Example: 
With K = {p→q, q→r, ¬s}, p is path-relevant to q but not to s. 
• However, the relation is syntax-dependent in K. Example: Add to the above K 
the formula (r→s)∨(s→r). As this is a tautology, it does not change the 
strength of K. But p is now path-relevant to s.  
• The relation trivializes when the belief set is closed under classical 
consequence. When K = Cn(K), any two contingent formulae a,b are path-
relevant to each other modulo K. Verification: Since a,b are contingent, each 
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of a*, b* has at least one letter. Take any letter p in a*, any letter q in b*, note 
that (p∨¬p)→(q∨¬q) ∈ Cn(K). 
 
Can we get around the syntax-dependence in the argument K? It is natural to try 
tweaking Definition 2.1, replacing x1,…,xn by their least letter-set versions x1*,…,xn*. 
However, this does not eliminate syntax-dependence. Example: Compare K = {p∧q} 
with p relevant to q (mod K) versus the equivalent K′ = {p,q} with p irrelevant to q 
(mod K′). A better idea is needed, and one was provided by Rohit Parikh in 1999, 
with his concept of a splitting of a belief set. 
 
 
3. Splittings of a Belief Set 
 
Definition 3.1. Let K be a (non-empty) belief set, expressed in the language of 
classical propositional logic (with a zero-ary connective). Let E be the set of all 
elementary letters of the language (or occurring in formulae in K). Let E = {Ei}i∈I be a 
partition of E (be careful: we partition the letter-set E, not the belief set K). We say 
that E is a splitting of K iff there is a family {Bi}i∈I of sets of formulae such that each 
E(Bi) ⊆ Ei and K  -||- ∪{Bi}i∈I. In other words, iff K can be represented as the union of 
belief sets each of which uses only letters from one of the cells of the partition. 
 
Background on partitions: Recall that a partition of a (non-empty) set is a family of 
disjoint non-empty subsets of that set, whose union exhausts the set. The partitions of 
a set can be put in one-one correspondence with the equivalence relations over the set. 
One partition is said to be finer than another iff the equivalence relation associated 
with the former is included (set-theoretically) in the equivalence relation associated 
with the latter. Equivalently, if every cell of the first partition is a subset of a cell of 
the second one. Recall that the infimum under fineness of any non-empty family of 
partitions of a set (i.e. the partition corresponding to the intesection of all the 
equivalence relations associated with partitions in the family) is also a partition of that 
set. 
 
Example: Let K = {p→¬q, ¬q→r, p∨s, ¬s, (r→t)∨(t→r)}. Here E = {p,q,r,s,t}.  
• The coarsest splitting of K is the singleton partition with E itself as its only 
cell, putting B = K. But we can do better than that.  
• Slightly less coarse is the partition into two cells  E1 = {p,q} and E2 = {r,s,t} 
with B1 = {p,¬q}, B2 = {r,¬s}. The letter t does not appear in either of the Bi, 
but that is not a problem – the definition requires only the inclusion E(Bi) ⊆ Ei 
for each i ∈ I.   
• The finest splitting of K partitions E into five singleton cells 
{p},{q},{r},{s},{t}, with B1 = {p}, B2 = {¬q}, B3 = {r}, B4 = {¬s}, B5 = ∅. 
Although each Ei must be non-empty (since it is a cell of a partition) the 
corresponding Bi may be empty.  
• In this example, for simplicity, the finest partition has singleton cells and the 
associated sets B1 to B5 consist only of literals. Of course, neither need always 
be the case. For instance take K = {(p→q)∧(r→s)}. Its finest partition is into 
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the two-element cells {p,q}, {r,s} with B1 = {p→q}, B2 = {r→s} containing 
non-literals. 
 
Theorem 3.1. (Rohit Parikh 1999). Every set K of formulae of classical propositional 
logic has a unique finest splitting. 
 
Comments:  
• It is the splitting E = {Ei}i∈I of elementary letters that is unique. Given such a 
family, there will evidently be many families {Bi}i∈I of sets of formulae with 
∪{Bi}i∈I -||- K and E(Bi) ⊆ Ei.  
• However, it simplifies formulations if we take a choice function associating 
with each K, having finest splitting E = {Ei}i∈I of elementary letters, some 
particular such family{Bi}i∈I, and write ∪{Bi}i∈I as K#. We abuse terminology 
a little by also calling K# the finest splitting of K. 
• Note that when two belief sets are classically equivalent, they will have 
exactly the same finest splitting E = {Ei}i∈I and thus exactly the same finest 
splitting K# = ∪{Bi}i∈I.  
 
Bibliographical: This theorem was proven by Parikh (1999) for the finite case. The 
infinite case proven by Kourousias and Makinson (2007), using a new form of 
interpolation called “parallel interpolation”. Both parallel interpolation and the finest 
splitting theorem can be extended to first-order logic.  
 
 
4. Canonical Relevance (Modulo a Belief Set) 
 
How can splitting help us make the notion of relevance modulo a belief set fully 
syntax-independent? The finest decomposition K# = ∪{Bi}i∈I of K may be seen as a 
canonical form for the belief set K, disentangling the roles of the different elementary 
letters as far as is possible without altering the power of K. We can refine Rodrigues’ 
definition of path relevance by taking the path through this canonical representation 
instead of through K itself. Thus in Definition 2.1, replacing x1,…,xn ∈ K by x1,…,xn 
∈ K#, we have the following.   
  
Definition 4.1. Let a,b be formulae of classical propositional logic, K be a set of 
formulae serving as a belief set, and K# be the finest splitting of K. We say that a is 
canonically path-relevant to b (mod K) iff there is a finite sequence x0,…xn+1 (n ≥ 0) 
of formulae with x0 = a*, xn+1 = b*, x1,…,xn ∈ K#, and each xi sharing at least one 
letter with xi+1. 
 
Comments: This time x1,…,xn are required to be elements of the canonical form K#, so 
we are looking at finite paths through K# (rather than through K itself). As before, it is 
not required that either of x0 = a*, xn+1 = b* is in K# (although of course they may be).  
 
To help the reader keep track of successive definitions, Appendix 1 contains a table of 
the different kinds of relevance considered in the paper. 
 
Features of canonical path relevance modulo K: 
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• As desired: syntax-independent in each of its arguments a, b, K. For the 
argument K, this follows from the fact, noted above, that equivalent belief sets 
have the same finest partition.  
• Like plain path-relevance, it is symmetric but not transitive (in the arguments 
a,b); almost reflexive; distinct elementary letters can be relevant to each other 
(mod K).   
 
There is another way of doing the same thing. It also uses Parikh’s notion of the finest 
splitting K# of K, but does not consider paths. Instead, it looks at cells.  
 
Definition 4.2. (Rohit Parikh 1999). Let a,b be formulae of classical propositional 
logic, let K be a set of formulae serving as a belief set, with E = {Ei}i∈I the finest 
splitting of K. We say that a is canonically cell-relevant to b (mod K) iff there is a cell 
Ei of E such that each of a* and b* shares some letter (not necessarily the same letter) 
with Ei. More formally: iff for some i ∈ I, each of the sets E(a*)∩Ei and E(b*)∩Ei is 
non-empty. 
 
Table 4.1: Illustration of canonical cell-relevance 
 
E1 E2 E3 
p                        q r                                        s   t                        u 
E(a*) E(b*) 
 
In this illustration, the finest partition E of K has three cells, each containing two 
elementary letters. The letters in a* and b* are disjoint, but there is a cell (the middle 
one) that contains letters r, s from both E(a*), E(b*) respectively. 
 
Bibliographical: Actually, Parikh (1999) worked with a,b rather than with a*,b*, and 
so did Kourousias and Makinson (2007). This makes no difference to the particular 
applications to AGM belief change operations made in those papers. But when 
considering the notion of relevance from a general perspective, it is evidently better to 
work with the least letter-set forms a*,b*. 
 
Theorem 4.1. Canonical path-relevance is equivalent to canonical cell-relevance. In 
detail: let a,b be formulae of classical propositional logic, and let K be a set of 
formulae serving as a belief set. Then a is canonically path-relevant to b (mod K) iff it 
is canonically cell-relevant to b (mod K). 
 
Proof: See Appendix 2. 
 
Summary of the story so far: By using Parikh’s notion of the finest splitting of K. we 
can refine Rodrigues’s account of relevance to make it syntax-independent in all three 
arguments a, b, K,  This notion of canonical path-relevance is equivalent to the more 
semantic-looking definition of canonical cell-relevance. This equivalence confirms 
the robustness of the concept, which henceforth we call simply canonical relevance. 
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Warning: When K1 |- K2 then since each Ki# -||- Ki we have K1# |- K2#.. But it does not 
follow that when K1 |- K2 and a is canonically relevant to b (mod K2) then a is 
canonically relevant to b (mod K1). Example: Put K1 = {p∧q}, K2 = {p→q}. Then K1 
|- K2 and p is canonically relevant to q (mod K2) but not so (mod K1). Canonical 
relevance depends on the logical power of K, but is not monotonically increasing in 
that power. 
 
 
5. Respecting Canonical Relevance in Belief Change 
 
We recall briefly some applications of canonical relevance to the study of AGM belief 
change in the manner of Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson 1985. We focus on 
the operation of contraction (omitting revision) and omit all proofs, which can be 
found in Kourousias and Makinson (2007).  
 
Definition 5.1. We say that an operation − of contraction on a belief set K respects 
canonical relevance iff whenever K |- x but K−a |/- x then a is canonically relevant to 
x (mod K). Contrapositively, whenever K |- x and a is canonically irrelevant to x (mod 
K) then still K−a |- x.  
 
Comment: When K is closed under classical consequence, i.e. when K = Cn(K) then 
for AGM contraction K−a is also closed under consequence, so we have K |- x,  K−a |- 
x iff respectively x ∈ K, x ∈ K−a, and thus Definition 5.1 becomes equivalent to one 
with epsilon replacing turnstile: whenever x ∈ K and a is canonically irrelevant to a 
(mod K) then still x ∈ K−a.  
 
Observation (Parikh 1999): AGM contraction can fail to respect canonical relevance, 
and this can happen independently of whether K is closed under consequence. 
 
Example: Let p,q be two distinct elementary letters, and put K = Cn(p,q). Then there 
is an AGM maxichoice contraction that puts K−p to be Cn(p↔q), thus eliminating not 
only p but also q from K. However, the letter q is canonically irrelevant to p modulo 
K. This is because we can split E = {p,q} into E1 = {p}, E2 = {q} with K# = {p,q}, and 
neither of these two cells contains both of the letters p and q.   
 
The example is robust in the sense that it goes through even when we work with belief 
bases rather than belief sets already closed under consequence. Put K0 = {p↔q,q}, so 
that Cn(K0) = K above. Then one of the AGM maxichoice base contractions puts K0−p 
to be {p↔q}, which eliminates q. However, the eliminated letter q is canonically 
irrelevant to p modulo K0 for the same reason as before. 
 
Theorem  5.1 (Kourousias and Makinson 2007). If we apply AGM contraction to the 
finest splitting K#
 
of a consistent belief set K, rather than to K itself, then it respects 
canonical relevance.  
 
Example: In the above example, we would be applying the contraction operation to 
the canonical belief set K# = {p,q} rather than to K = Cn(p,q) or to K0 = {p↔q,q}. 
Since there is just one maximal p-nonimplying subset of K#, namely {q}, it follows 
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that in this example there is just one possible output of an AGM belief contraction 
operation K#−p, namely {q}.     
 
Comments: (1) Actually, the observation of Parikh (1999) was made for AGM 
revision, but the counterexamples for the two operations are essentially the same. (2) 
Theorem 5.1 was established by Kourousias and Makinson (2007) only for the epsilon 
version of respecting equivalence, rather than the turnstile version. The two are not 
the same, as remarked by Pavlos Peppas (personal communication). However, it is not 
difficult to obtain the turnstile version of the theorem from the epsilon one, as is done 
in Appendix 3. 
 
 
6. Should Canonical Relevance Always be Respected? 
 
Of course, we may ask whether it is really a shortcoming in a belief contraction 
operation to eliminate canonically irrelevant formulae. Is this failure to respect 
canonical relevance a defect, or just a feature of AGM contraction?  
 
To answer this question, we need to distinguish between logical and epistemic 
components of relevance. The notion of canonical relevance appears to capture well 
the logical or formal component, but leaves aside entirely the epistemic one.  
 
Consider again the example where we wish to contract the belief base K0 = {p↔q,q} 
to discard p. If we are interested only in logical matters, then we note as above that 
K0# = {p,q} so that q is not canonically relevant to p modulo K0. In that context, 
discarding p should not lead us to eliminate q, but rather p↔q, which is canonically 
relevant to p modulo K0.    
 
But it may also happen that the formula p↔q has a special place among our beliefs. It 
may be more deeply entrenched, less vulnerable, or in some other way epistemically 
more basic than either of the letters p,q or their conjunction p∧q, all of which are 
elements of Cn(K0). In that context, when discarding p we should keep the 
biconditional p↔q and jettison the letter q. The eliminated formula q is not logically 
relevant to the formula p that we are discarding, but it is epistemically so, since it 
occurs in a formula p↔q to which we are attributing special epistemic status.  
 
In general, when a belief set is presented by a base, we may have differing attitudes 
towards the propositions in the base. Some may be there for convenience or by 
happenstance, and another equivalent base lacking them may be deemed as just as 
appropriate. But others may be in the base because we want them to be there; they 
may have an epistemic priority over consequences outside the base and even some 
others within it.  
 
Essentially this perspective was suggested in the brief discussion in Makinson and 
Kourousias (2007). Now we take the analysis further by showing how we can take 
formal account of such extra-logical considerations.  
 
 
7. Generalizations: Parametrized and Epistemic Relevance 
 
 9 
Of course, logic alone cannot specify which propositions are deemed to have a 
particular epistemic status. But it can introduce into its constructions parameters that 
allow such considerations to play a role. We now express these intuitive ideas more 
formally. This requires generalizing some definitions and results of previous sections. 
 
First, we observe that the notion of canonical cell/path relevance, which was 
introduced (Definition 4.2) using the finest splitting of K, may be generalized to a 
notion of cell/path relevance with respect to an arbitrary splitting. In terms of cells, 
this may naturally be done as follows: 
 
Definition 7.1. Let a,b be formulae of classical propositional logic, let K be a set of 
formulae serving as a belief set, and E = {Ei}i∈I any splitting of K. We say that a is 
relevant to b modulo E iff there is a cell Ei of E such that each of a* and b* shares 
some letter (not necessarily the same letter) with Ei. More formally: iff for some i ∈ I, 
each of the sets E(a*)∩Ei and E(b*)∩Ei is non-empty. 
 
In turn, the notion of respect for canonical relevance, which was formulated with 
respect to the finest splitting, may be reformulated with respect to an arbitrary 
splitting. 
 
Definition 7.2. Let K be a set of formulae serving as a belief set, and E = {Ei}i∈I any 
splitting of K. We say that an operation − of contraction on K respects relevance 
modulo E iff whenever K |- x but K−a |/- x then a is relevant to x modulo E. 
Contrapositively, whenever K |- x and a is irrelevant to x modulo E then still K−a |- x.  
 
Next, we note that two key theorems may also be strengthened to cover the more 
general context of arbitrary splittings.  
 
Theorem 7.1. Let K be any set of formulae of classical propositional logic. The 
infimum of any non-empty family of splittings of K is also a splitting of K.  
 
Proof: The proof of Theorem 3.1 (the finest splitting theorem) that is given in 
Kourousias and Makinson (2007) may be applied without change to yield this 
generalization.        
 
Theorem 7.2 Let K be a consistent set of formulae serving as a belief set. If we apply 
AGM contraction to an arbitrarily chosen splitting of K, then it respects relevance 
modulo that splitting.  
 
Proof: Simply re-run the one given for Theorem 5.1. 
 
With these generalizations in hand, we can introduce a parameter to handle extra-
logical (and in particular, epistemic) sources of relevance.  
 
Definition 7.3. Let K be a set of formulae serving as a belief set, and let R be any 
relation between elementary letters. We say that a splitting E = {Ei}i∈I of K protects R  
iff whenever (p,q) ∈ R then p,q are in the same cell Ei of E.  
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Theorem 7.3. Let K be a set of formulae serving as a belief set, and let R be any 
relation between elementary letters. Then K has a (unique) finest R-protecting 
splitting.  
 
Proof. By Theorem 7.1, the infimum of all R-protecting splittings of K is a splitting of 
K, and it is straightforward to check that it also protects R.  
 
Theorem 7.4. Let K be a consistent set of formulae serving as a belief set, and let R be 
any relation between elementary letters. If we apply AGM contraction to that finest R-
protecting splitting
 
rather than to K itself, then it respects relevance modulo that 
splitting.  
 
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 7.2. 
 
There are many ways, semantic and syntactic, of specifying a relation R between 
letters that we may want to be protected. One simple method is to distinguish a special 
subset of the belief set consisting of formulae whose syntactic expression we regard 
as carrying epistemic information about the formulae in it and the connections 
between the elementary letters occurring in those formulae. This suggests the 
following: 
 
Definition 7.4. Let K be a belief state and let K1 ⊆ K. We say that a splitting E = 
{Ei}i∈I of K protects K1 iff it protects the relation R defined by putting (p,q) ∈ R iff 
there is a formula x ∈ K1 containing both p and q.  
 
The relation of protection evidently depends on the syntax of the formulae in K1. For 
example, a conjunction in K1 will not have the same effect as the two conjuncts in it, 
since we are looking at two formulae rather than a single one. But this is deliberate: a 
formula is put in K1 only when we see its syntactic form as carrying epistemic 
information. From Theorems 7.3 and 7.4 we have immediately: 
 
Corollary to Theorems 7.3 and 7.4. Let K be a set of formulae serving as a belief set, 
and let K1 ⊆ K. Then K has a (unique) finest K1-protecting splitting. Moreover, for 
consistent K, if we apply AGM contraction to the splitting
 
rather than to K itself, then 
it respects relevance modulo that splitting.  
 
The kinds of relevance defined in earlier sections come out as limiting cases. In 
particular: 
 
• In the limiting case that K1 = ∅, we are taking no notice of the syntactic 
features of any of the formulae in K. Nothing is protected, the finest K1-
protecting splitting of K is just the finest splitting of K, and thus epistemic 
relevance coincides with Parikh’s canonical relevance (Definition 4.2).  
 
• At the other end of the spectrum, when K1 = K, we are taking notice of the 
syntactic formulation of every formula in K, and epistemic relevance coincides 
with Rodrigues’ path-relevance modulo (Definition 2.1).  
 
Summary of this section: Thus the introduction of a parameter into the central 
definitions provides sufficient flexibility to represent extra-logical sources of 
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relevance. In particular, it allows the believing agent to specify whether there are any 
special formulae in the belief set that create connections between letters, beyond the 
purely logical ones. The extent to which epistemic relevance goes beyond canonical 
relevance depends on how much of its belief set the agent puts into the set K1. 
 
 
Appendices 
 
 
Appendix 1: Table of Kinds of Relevance Discussed in this Paper 
 
Name  Arguments Syntax- 
independent? 
syntactic relevance no 
essential relevance 
 
formulae yes 
path-relevance 
cell-relevance 
 
except in K 
 
canonical (path/cell) 
relevance 
 
formulae plus belief set K 
 
yes 
parametrized 
relevance 
formulae plus belief set K 
plus relation R over letters 
yes  
epistemic relevance  formulae plus belief set K 
plus subset K1 ⊆ K 
except in K1  
 
 
Appendix 2. Proof of Theorem 4.1 
 
Theorem 4.1. Canonical path-relevance is equivalent to canonical cell-relevance. In 
detail: let a,b be formulae of classical propositional logic, and let K be a set of 
formulae serving as a belief set. Then a is canonically path-relevant to b (mod K) iff it 
is canonically cell-relevant to b (mod K). 
 
Proof. Left to right: Suppose that a is canonically path-relevant to b (mod K). Then 
there is a finite sequence x0,…xn+1 (n ≥ 0) of formulae with x0 = a*, xn+1 = b*, all of 
x1,…,xn ∈ K#, and each xi sharing at least one letter with xi+1. Let p be a letter shared 
by x0 = a* and x1, and let q be a letter shared by xn and xn+1 = b*. Since all of x1,…,xn 
∈ K#, and each xi shares at least one letter with xi+1. it follows that all of the letters in 
x1,…,xn come from the same cell Ei of the finest splitting of K. Thus in particular p 
and q come from the same cell Ei, so each of the sets E(a*)∩Ei and E(b*)∩Ei is non-
empty as required for canonical cell-relevance.      
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Right to left: Suppose that a is canonically cell-relevant to b (mod K). Then there is a 
cell Ei of the finest splitting E of K such that each of the sets E(a*)∩Ei and E(b*)∩Ei 
is non-empty. By the former, there is a letter p ∈ Ei occurring in a*. Since p ∈ Ei it 
occurs in some formula x ∈ Bi ⊆ K# (otherwise the splitting would not be finest, as we 
could further split Ei into {p} and Ei\{p}). Likewise by the second there is a letter q 
occurring in a* and in some formula y ∈ Bi ⊆ K#. We need to show that there are 
x1,…,xn in K# with x = x1, y = xn and each xi sharing a letter with xi+1. But this must 
hold because otherwise we could take the closure{x}+ of {x} under the relation of 
sharing a letter, to split Ei further into E({x}+) and Ei\ E({x}+).  
 
Appendix 3. Derivation of Theorem 5.1 (turnstile version) from its epsilon 
counterpart  
 
Theorem 5.1 states that if we apply AGM contraction to the finest splitting K#
 
of a 
consistent belief set K, rather than to K itself, then it always respects relevance. In 
other words, whenever K# |- x but K#−a |/- x then a is canonically relevant to x (mod 
K). In Kourousias and Makinson (2007) this was proven in an ‘epsilon version: 
whenever x ∈ K# but x ∉ K#−a then a is canonically relevant to x (mod K).  
 
To derive the turnstile version of the theorem from the epsilon one, it suffices to show 
that for AGM contraction on a consistent belief set K, respect for relevance (epsilon 
version) implies respect for relevance (turnstile version). 
 
Assume the epsilon version. Suppose that K is consistent, K# |- x, K#−a |/- x; we need 
to show that a is canonically relevant to x (mod K). Since K# |- x we have K# |- x*, so 
there are a1,…,ak ∈ K# with a1∧…∧ak |- x*. Since K is consistent, we may assume 
without loss of generality that each ai* shares a letter with x*. Since K#−a |/- x we 
likewise have K#−a |/- x*, so there is an i ≤ k with K#−a |/- ai, so that ai ∉ K#−a. By the 
epsilon version of the theorem, a is canonically relevant to ai (mod K). That is, there 
is a cell Ej of the finest partition E of K such that each of the sets E(a*)∩Ej and 
E(ai*)∩Ej is non-empty. Since ai ∈ K# all the letters of ai come from the same cell, so 
E(ai) ⊆ Ej. But E(ai*) ⊆ E(ai), and so also E(ai*) ⊆ Ej. Since ai* shares a letter with 
x*, this tells us that  E(x*)∩Ej is non-empty. Putting together the non-emptiness of 
E(a*)∩Ej and of E(x*)∩Ej we may conclude that that a is canonically relevant to x 
(mod K) as desired, and the proof is complete. 
 
It is also possible to prove Theorem 5.1 (turnstile version) directly, essentially by 
including the above considerations within a re-run of the proof of the epsilon version.  
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